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Abstract
We examine the relationship between socio-economic factors and public opinion on en-
vironmental policies in Brazil, drawing on a survey conducted in June 2012. There are few
systematic studies of the determinants of environmental preferences in emerging economies,
and Brazil is a particularly interesting case because of its democratic political system, rapid
economic growth, and importance for the global environment. In general, we find that the
Brazilian public is highly supportive of environmental protection. To explain variation in en-
vironmental preferences, we focus on the effects of income and education. Many previous
studies suggest that both should have positive effects, but the empirical evidence is mixed.
Indeed, we find that income has no effect on environmental preferences. However, education
is a strong predictor of environmental preferences. While college education is not necessary
for environmental awareness, there is a large difference between Brazilians with primary and
secondary education. For policy, the findings imply that investment in secondary education
can raise environmental awareness, regardless of income levels.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes survey data to investigate the relationship between income, education, and
peoples’ environmental preferences in Brazil.1 While there is a voluminous literature on the
determinants of environmental preferences in industrialized countries (Stern, Dietz, and Kalof,
1993; Tranter, 1997; Rabe and Borick, 2009; Aldy, Kotchen, and Leiserowitz, 2012), much less
is known about this issue in emerging economies. Even though several surveys – for instance,
the World Value Survey2, the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project3, and the Instituto de
Estudos da Religia˜o opinion polls4, conducted on behalf of the Brazilian Environment Ministry
(Ministe´rio do Meio Ambiente) – regularly collect data on environmental preferences in Brazil,
the determinants of these preferences remain underexplored. Therefore, we not only provide
descriptive statistics on environmental preferences, but emphasize income and education as ex-
planatory variables to examine variation across Brazilians’ environmental preferences.
Analyzing income and education as determinants of environmental preferences in a quickly
industrializing country like Brazil is important as environmental preferences may systematically
differ between developing and developed countries. Tastes may be different; a large body of
economic literature suggests that poorer countries place a lower premium on a clean environment
(Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Rothman, 1998). Alternatively, people may experience various
local environmental problems that are not relevant in industrialized countries.
Brazil is an interesting case for several reasons. First, the importance of emerging powers for
global environmental governance is increasingly acknowledged (Aldy and Stavins, 2007; Roberts
1A supplementary appendix and a replication package will be made available online upon publication.
2The most recent 2010-2012 wave of the World Value Survey contains questions on the economy-environment trade-
off, whether money was given to environmental organizations, and whether the respondent participated in a demon-
stration for some environmental cause. For further details and the data, see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_116. Accessed on February 23, 2013.
3For instance, the “Most Muslim Publics Not So Easily Moved” survey from July 23, 2009, contains questions on
whether global warming is considered a very serious problem, whether the environment should be protected even if
this costs jobs, whether people would be willing to pay higher prices to address climate change, and which country is
trusted the most in international climate policy. See http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/264.pdf. Accessed on
February 23, 2013.
4The “O Que o Brasiliero Pensa do Meio Ambiente e do Consumo Sustenta´vel” survey, published in Octo-
ber 2001, presents detailed survey results on the economy-environment tradeoff and sustainable development,
Brazilians’ information levels about environmental issues, and what Brazilians consider as their country’s most
distinctive environmental asset and as the most pressing environmental problems. For additional details, see
www.brazilink.org/tiki-download_file.php?fileId=199. Accessed on February 23, 2013.
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and Parks, 2007). From China to India and Brazil, rapid economic growth is increasing resource
consumption, waste, and pollution. Second, there is evidence that public opinion is a major
determinant of policies in democratic countries (Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1994; Page and
Shapiro, 1983). Since elected officials are more constrained by the preferences of their citizens
than non-elected officials, public opinion is a potentially powerful determinant of environmental
policy in a democratic country like Brazil (Bernauer and Koubi, 2009). Finally, understanding
what shapes the preferences of Brazilians is particularly important. Brazil is one of the ten largest
economies worldwide, and second only to China among emerging countries.5 The deforestation
of the Amazon rainforest is a major source of climate change (Shukla, Nobre, and Sellers, 1990;
Araujo et al., 2009). In sum, Brazil is a major economic and environmental player. The emergence
of politicians such as the Partido Verde’s Marina Silva (Green Party), who gathered almost 20% of
the popular vote to the 2010 presidential elections, underscores the emergence of environmental
concerns in Brazil.6 Yet, little is known about the Brazilian people’s environmental preferences.
To analyze Brazilian public opinion on environmental policy, we draw on a survey conducted
by the Brazilian Senate’s own survey organization, DataSenado.7 The survey is based on a
telephone poll of 1,226 Brazilians in 119 municipalities during the period June 1-14, 2012, imme-
diately before the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development.8 We analyze
responses to four important questions about environmental policy. Respondents were asked to
indicate their level of support for the environmental policies of candidates to public jobs (Ques-
tion 1), their views about existing environmental regulation (Question 2), their opinion about the
trade-offs between economic development and pollution (Question 3), and Brazil’s consideration
of environmental problems when dealing with other countries (Question 4).
In general, we find the Brazilian people to be highly supportive of the environment. We also
find that education has a positive effect on pro-environmental views. The effect is significant for a
5Data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database, accessed on October 20, 2012.
6“Brazil election sees breakthrough for Greens and environmental agenda” The Guardian, http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2010/oct/04/brazil-election-breakthrough-greens.
7See http://www.senado.gov.br/noticias/datasenado. Accessed October 8, 2012.
8Undoubtedly, the timing increased the population’s awareness of environmental issues. However, we are mainly
interested in the population’s relative preferences, not in how they compare with other countries’ populations. There-
fore, our main results remain valid as long as the effect of Rio+20 was roughly even across the population. See below
for a discussion on the upwards bias that exists in environmental surveys.
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range of different preferences over various facets of environmental policy. The results are robust
to the inclusion of state fixed effects and several relevant control variables. Given that education is
associated with increased awareness about environmental deterioration in the Brazilian context,
these results suggest that informational factors play an important role in shaping environmental
preferences.
Income, however, does not appear to predict variation in environmental preferences. One
reason may be that environmental quality is similarly valued across different segments of the
population, from the poorest to the wealthiest. This may result from the fact that many Brazil-
ians are exposed to local environmental degradation, such as land degradation and poor water
quality.9 In such circumstances, solving environmental issues is perhaps not particularly more
valued by the richest. While our survey excludes Brazilians who have no telephone, the sample
does contain people who have no formal income.
We examined the data further to understand when education matters. We find that the key
educational threshold is at the secondary level. People who completed secondary schooling are
significantly more likely to support environmental views than people who only have primary
education. However, a college degree does not make people more supportive of the environment
than those who completed a secondary education. We also note that education and income are
not strongly correlated (r = 0.31), thereby suggesting that the negligible income effect is not
caused by conflating it with education.
Regarding income, we find evidence suggesting that the middle class is generally more pro-
environmental than the poor, while the wealthiest are often less environmentally friendly than the
poorest respondents. However, since the effects for income are often not statistically significant,
the estimations cannot confirm the presence of such non-linear relationships.
Our study offers new insight into the determinants of environmental preferences among the
citizens of a rapidly growing country. We extend existing scholarship on environmental policy,
which has largely focused on wealthy countries. Given that emerging powers are now key play-
ers in global environmental politics, it is important to understand how their citizens perceive
9For the relationship between the local environment and happiness, see Brereton, Clinch, and Ferreira (2008).
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environmental issues and how these views might evolve. An increasingly educated workforce
in Brazil may contribute to the country’s adoption of increasingly green positions in multilateral
negotiations, especially given Brazil’s democratic political institutions.
2 Environmental Policy Preferences: Income and Education
The rise of environmental issues has produced a large body of literature studying individual
attitudes toward the environment (Franzen, 2003). Specifically, scholars have attempted to iden-
tify the main determinants that predict a person’s awareness of environmental issues and her
willingness to solve these issues. Simplifying this broad scholarship, we focus on two sets of
important characteristics: income and education. The rationale for limiting our scope is that
environmental issues have complex origins and consequences (Brown, Harris, and Russell, 2010)
and solving them is generally costly.
2.1 Income and Education
Although economic growth is often associated with pollution (Meadows, Randers, and Meadows,
2004), various academic disciplines have long suspected that income favors pro-environmental
views. The environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis posits that environmental degradation fol-
lows an inverted-U shaped trajectory as a country’s income grows (Grossman and Krueger, 1995;
Galeotti, Lanza, and Pauli, 2006). Income changes people’s preferences and strengthens the
government’s incentive to reduce negative environmental externalities, including pollution and
waste (Dasgupta et al., 2002).
The link between income, values, and environmental preferences has also been recognized by
scholars studying public opinion. Early findings seemed to suggest a negative relationship be-
tween income and environmental concern. Dunlap and Mertig (1995) aggregate responses from
the Health of the Planet survey at the national level and find a negative bivariate correlation
between income per capita and environmental concern. These findings were soon subsumed
by numerous studies that showed, however, a robust positive relationship between individual
welfare and environmental preferences. Proponents of the ‘affluence hypothesis’ present evi-
dence that wealthier individuals are more willing to forgo some of their income for a cleaner
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environment. Diekmann and Franzen (1999) analyze data from the 1993 International Social Sur-
vey Programme (ISSP) and find a positive bivariate correlation between income per capita and
environmental preferences. Franzen (2003) draws on a 2000 ISSP survey and finds that environ-
mental concern at the national level increases with wealth, but not in a linear way; recent growth
in the 1990s did not lead to additional reported concern about the environment. Other scholars
have examined within-country variation of environmental views. Kemmelmeier, Kro´l, and Kim
(2002) study the 1993 ISSP data on a country-by-country basis and find that wealthier individuals
are more willing to invest in a cleaner environment, but they argue that income mainly has an
indirect effect by changing values and not only by making environmental concern more afford-
able. They also find that education has a positive effect on environmental preferences in most
countries in the sample.
This argument is related to post-materialism (Inglehart, 1995, 1997), which contends that
individuals’ values shift with their affluence. Wealthier people are more likely to value a clean
environment and be able to afford it, since it often comes at some economic cost. Inglehart (1995)
examines data from the World Value Survey and obtains ambiguous findings. While citizens from
wealthier countries are more likely to have taken concrete actions to protect the environment, the
level of concern is also high in poor countries. Inglehart suggests that environmental concern
can come both from a change in values through increased income and from being at risk of
environmental degradation due to a low income. Using country-level data, Knight and Messer
(2012) provide support for the idea that vulnerability to environmental issues is an indicator for
a country’s average willingness to pay for a cleaner environment.
Empirically, Franzen and Meyer (2010) provide evidence that corroborates both the affluence
and the post-materialistic argument. Using a multilevel approach and drawing on ISSP data from
2000, they find that the wealthiest segment of each country tends to be more concerned about the
environment. The effect of education is generally also positive, though the results fluctuate more
and are not always statistically significant. They find that countries that are richer tend to exhibit
higher degrees of pro-environmental preferences. Further, they also provide evidence suggesting
that changing values may play a role in environmental attitudes. Overall, this reflects both the
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notion that income has a direct effect, in terms of the ability to pay for a cleaner environment,
and an indirect effect, by increasing the relative importance of non-materialistic preferences.
Finally, an additional strand of literature examines the opposite causal story. Using survey
data from Switzerland, Bechtel, Bernauer, and Meyer (2011) ask whether individuals that are
more concerned about the environment are more likely to be willing to engage in restrictive
economic policies, such as trade restrictions. They find this to be the case, though the effect is
only significant for people self-identifying as having leftist preferences.
Since environmental issues are complex problems that have mainly attracted the scientific
community’s attention, it seems intuitively plausible that knowledge and education may also be
an important predictors of pro-environmental attitudes. Liere and Dunlap (1980) offer an early
review of the evidence on education and environmental preferences. The literature that they
consult on education suggests a positive correlation between the level of education and a range
of variables capturing environmental concern, although they provide no information about the
statistical significance of these findings.
Franzen and Meyer (2010) perform a cross-national survey analysis of environmental attitudes
in a dataset of emerging and industrialized countries. Using a multilevel regression analysis, they
find that education is generally positively related to environmental concern. However, they find
that the relation may not necessarily be linear; rather, it is exponential in some models, while it
follows a U-shaped path in some specifications.
These cross-national studies have been augmented by analysis at national and subnational
levels. Using representative survey data from Australia, Tranter (1997) finds that tertiary ed-
ucation is positively associated with environmental activism. Based on a survey in Kentucky,
Arcury (1990) finds that more educated respondents know more about environmental issues
and are more willing to engage in pro-environmental reforms. Liu, Ouyang, and Miao (2010)
provide evidence that education matters in emerging countries, too. Examining the case of the
Protected Area of Junyun Mountain in China, they find that education levels significantly predict
pro-environmental attitudes.
The consensus on education is not perfect, however. Cotgrove and Duff (1981) offer a more
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nuanced perspective, suggesting that ‘industrialist’ individuals who derive their livelihood from
possibly polluting activities tend to be highly educated, too. Indeed, considering the case of
climate change, Kahan et al. (2012) provide survey evidence from the U.S. that more knowledge
does not translate into higher support for scientific work. Rather, the effect is contingent on
political preferences.
2.2 Income, Education, and Environmental Concern in Emerging Countries
Overall, little is known about whether the findings from industrialized countries are externally
valid for emerging countries as well. The data analyzed so far generally stem from a fairly small
set of countries that are fairly homogeneous. We do not know whether these results would hold
in a different setting. There are a few noteworthy exceptions. Bloom (1995) uses Gallup data from
1992 and the “Public and Leadership Attitudes to the Environment in Four Continents” survey
from 1988-1989. He finds that respondents from developing countries are more likely to worry
about local pollution, and about equally likely to consider global environmental problems as
being important. Dunlap and Mertig’s (1995) study contained six low income and seven middle
income countries. However, their study aggregates responses at the national level and does not
explain individual support for the environment. More recently, Ignatow (2005) examines support
for environmental protection in Turkey. He finds little evidence that individual wealth shapes
environmental preferences.
Differences may emerge for many reasons. First, tastes may differ. The public’s preferences
for public goods, in particular environmental goods, may be very different in non-Western coun-
tries. Second, the literature cited above suggests that the degree of economic development affects
preferences. Yet, these findings concentrate on a fairly small number of highly developed coun-
tries. But, how can we explain these within-country differences in emerging countries? The
environmental scholarship offers little guidance here.
We explore these questions drawing on survey data from Brazil. In light of the reviewed liter-
ature, we offer two hypotheses concerning the relationship between Brazilians’ attitudes toward
the environment and their (i) income and (ii) education. First, based on the vast literature on
the effects of income on environmental preferences, we examine the effect that peoples’ income
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has on their responses. A clean environment has a high positive income elasticity according to
the post-materialistic scholarship and the affluence hypothesis (Diekmann and Franzen, 1999;
Inglehart, 1995).
This ought to be even clearer among a population that is poorer than those analyzed in the
extant literature. Higher degrees of income increase the share of income that can be spent on
non-essential goods, such as environmental (public) goods. We expect environmental goods to
exhibit high income elasticity, at least for the poorest segments of the population. Since poorer
individuals have little disposable income, their willingness to spend on environmental goods is
limited. Their primary concerns pertain to basic needs, such as shelter and food. While environ-
mental issues often have an effect to poor people due to higher vulnerability, we expect concerns
about environmental risk to be channeled through concerns about basic needs. Wealthier people,
instead, can due to their affluence afford to worry about environmental issues for their own sake.
For these reasons, we expect income to have a positive effect on attitudes toward environmental
issues.
Hypothesis 1 (Income and environmental preferences). Environmental concern increases with in-
come.
We acknowledge two main counterarguments against this idea. First, wealthy individuals
may be able to invest in private mitigation, such as relocating to areas with little pollution, instead
of paying for regulations that protect the national environment. In this case, the effect of income
on environmental policy preferences may be suppressed. Although wealthy individuals prefer
a clean environment, they may want it for themselves, with less concern for the environment in
which the poor live. Second, Brazil’s high levels of income inequality and economic structure
based on natural resources (Hochstetler and Keck, 2007) may lead wealthy individuals to con-
clude that they would have to pay a heavy price for environmental regulation (Hotte and Winer,
2012). In this case, they may oppose environmental policy despite an intrinsic preference for a
clean environment. If they would have to significantly change their behavior, the cost could be
too high, especially in conjunction with the possibility of private mitigation discussed above.
Additionally, we suggest that education helps people recognize and identify environmental
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issues. In a world where individuals operate under cognitive limitations, additional information
in the form of formal education ought to increase people’s awareness of environmental problems.
The rationale of this argument can be expanded as follows. Individuals operate under in-
complete and imperfect information. Acquiring information is costly, making partial ignorance
rational (Downs, 1957; Simon, 1997). Public education is one way to provide useful information
at a low cost. Schooling teaches individuals about environmental degradation, which is partic-
ularly important since many environmental issues are hidden: they may be very localized, their
causal relation to human activity may be unclear, or their occurrence may be delayed in time.
Since individuals cannot directly experience environmental harm for these types of environmen-
tal problems, information and awareness are necessary for environmental concern. For example,
Brazilians who do not live in the Amazon do not directly experience deforestation. If they have
high levels of education, however, they can connect land use change, deforestation, and various
local and global environmental problems.
A second reason that could explain the effect of schooling is higher education’s effect on
people’s values. For instance, a good education may lead individuals to build a set of ethical
principles that might be more environmentally conscious. If the curriculum discusses natural
resource management and pollution from an ethical perspective, individuals can more readily
internalize the complex arguments that underpin intergenerational equity and sustainability.
Finally, schooling may increase people’s trust in science and make them more responsive
to the worries regularly put forward by the scientific community. People with higher levels of
education are more familiar with the scientific method, and therefore they are more receptive to
warnings by scientists about the lack of environmental sustainability in contemporary Brazil.
Hypothesis 2 (Education and environmental preferences). Environmental concern increases with
education.
Education could have an effect on environmental policy preferences at different levels. First,
college education could be critical because it focuses on higher learning. College students can
enroll in classes that deal with environmental science or complex ethical issues related to the
environment. In this telling, the highest levels of education are particularly conducive to envi-
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ronmental awareness. On the other hand, it could be that secondary education – high school
or vocational – could be enough. Already at this level, students can learn about the basic func-
tioning of natural systems and their relevance for human wellbeing. According to this view,
basic awareness suffices to shape environmental policy preferences, and higher learning is not
necessary for the effect to materialize.
3 Research Design
Brazil is one of the most influential emerging countries. A democracy since 1985, the country’s
population of roughly 200 million has grown by 32%, and its economy has expanded by 62%
since 1990.10 This has led commentators to suggest that Brazil is now one of the most influential
emerging democracies at the regional and international level.11
Brazil’s growth, although generally lower than that of other emerging countries, also trans-
formed it into one of the world’s premier polluters. Its carbon dioxide emissions, while only rep-
resenting 1% of the world’s total emissions, places the country among the 20 largest emitters.12
Further, its influence as a greenhouse gas emitter is likely to increase as both its population and
its income rises. Importantly, Brazil’s greenhouse gases stem in a relative large proportion from
changes in land use, not from energy consumption (Johnson, 2001). Indeed, Brazil relies heavily
on biofuels and hydroelectric power. The deforestation of the Amazon both immediately releases
carbon in the atmosphere and reduces the planet’s capacity to provide carbon sinks (Johnson,
2001: 86). Besides global climate change, Brazil also suffers from local environmental issues. The
country suffers from problems that are typical of rapidly growing countries, such as air pollution
(Anderson, 2009) and water pollution (Martinelli and Filoso, 2008).
The literature on public opinion teaches us that democratic political institutions tend to in-
duce officials to reflect the views of their citizens (Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1994; Page and
Shapiro, 1983). If they want to be reelected, officials must listen to their population’s demands.
10Data from the Penn World Tables 7. Accessed on October 25, 2012.
11For instance, Brazil has sought more influence in the management of international institutions such as the
IMF. “Brazil Seeks More IMF Influence After Loan Promise: Week Ahead” Bloomberg, April 19, 2009. See
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aApYqdODdNfY&refer=news. Accessed on November
1, 2012. Alternatively, “BRIC has growing world influence” China Daily, April 16, 2010. See http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/2010-04/16/content_9737299.htm. Accessed on November 1, 2012.
12Data from the World Resource Institute’s CAIT 8 dataset. Accessed on October 12, 2012.
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Elections offer a cheap way for citizens to replace officials who do not further policies that are
agreeable to them. Though not conclusive, evidence suggests that democracies are responsive to
the demands of voters (e.g., Lax and Phillips, 2009).
Since public policy is conditioned by voter preferences in democracies and little is known
about what determines Brazilians’ environmental preferences, understanding the preferences of
the country’s citizens with respect to the environment offers a potentially large payoff. This
paper analyzes data from a survey that was conducted in Portuguese between June 1-14, 2012
by DataSenado for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development held in Rio de
Janeiro on June 20-22, 2012. Since the conference was widely announced, undoubtedly some
respondents were aware of the upcoming event and possibly also more aware of environmental
issues.
A total of 1,226 respondents were surveyed by telephone on their environmental policy prefer-
ences. All respondents were residents of Brazil, at least 16 years old, and had access to a landline
telephone. The sampling strategy involved two stages. The first stage uses probabilistic sam-
pling, where state capitals were chosen with probability one and Brazilian municipalities were
selected with a probability equal to their population. This resulted in a total of 119 municipalities,
including 26 state capitals and the Federal districts. The second stage of the sampling process
drew landline telephone numbers using quota sampling since there does not exist a master list
with all landline numbers. The margin of error for the survey is 3%, and trained professionals
checked 20% of the interviews as quality audit. Missing data forces us to drop between 11 and
60 observations depending on econometric model specifications, which is, however, a benign
number by the standards of survey analysis.
While the survey methodology used by DataSenado for gathering survey information on
environmental preferences across Brazil ensures geographical stratification, our sample over-
represents the rich and better educated compared to Brazilian census data. Since income and
education are our key explanatory variables, the non-representativeness of the sample may bias
our results. We account for this problem econometrically by re-estimating all our models with
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sampling weights, which we constructed to reflect the Brazilian 2010 census data.13 In the sup-
plementary appendix, to which we relegate a detailed description of how sampling weights are
constructed, we show that our results hold by and large. Since the increase in standard errors is
an immediate consequence of the weighting up of rare combinations of income and education,
the robustness of our findings confirms that the results are not driven by biased sample selection.
3.1 Dependent Variable
In choosing our dependent variables, we rely on two approaches. On the one hand, we report
results on substantively central outcome questions from the survey. The strength of this approach
is that we scrutinize the robustness of our findings across a wide range of measures that should
produce similar results. On the other hand, we also follow Dunlap et al. (2000) in building
an index of environmental concern. This approach allows us to aggregate results from various
questions, which is particularly important in case the findings for different questions conflict
with each other. With a total of five different dependent variables, we are able to deal with
imperfections in measurement. For example, the question on considering environmental issues
in voting could, at least in principle, lead some anti-environmental respondents to answer in the
positive.
Table 1 summarizes the questions that we examine. It also contains our coding scheme. For
all dependent variables, higher values indicate a more pro-environmental stance by the respon-
dent. For the analysis, we selected four questions from the survey. They pertain to the recipient’s
opinion on (1) the importance of a candidate’s environmental policy proposals before voting, (2)
environmental legislation in Brazil, (3) the economy-environment trade-off, and (4) the impor-
tance of the environment during international negotiations.
[Table 1 about here.]
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the different dependent variables along with the ex-
planatory and control variables used in this study. In the appendix, we present the correlation
matrix for all these variables. Notice that while the dependent variables describe various facets of
13See ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/Censos/Censo_Demografico_2010/Educacao_e_Deslocamento/pdf/tab_
educacao.pdf, Tabela 1.1.15 for the relevant information. Accessed on February 28, 2013.
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the respondents’ environmental preferences, their actual correlation coefficients are fairly low, al-
beit positive and statistically significant. This means that each question contains an independent
signal that can be used to test our two hypotheses.
[Table 2 about here.]
Notice that since each question was presented without reference to any negative counter-
message, such as one about the cost of environmental regulation (Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013),
and since environmental issues suffer from social desirability bias (Himmelfarb and Lickteig,
1982), it is not surprising that the answers are on average more pro- than anti-environment. In
addition, as we indicated above, the survey was conducted shortly before the Rio Conference,
which might have increased the salience of environmental issues among the Brazilian population.
However, given our interest in the variation of preferences in a single country, this should not
threaten the reliability of our results as long as the effects operate in a similar manner across the
Brazilian population.
Finally, we performed a factor analysis using the responses to the four questions to derive a
single index of pro-environmental views for each respondent. The correlation coefficient between
the factor score and each of the four other dependent variables ranges between r = 0.44 and
r = 0.67. The factor score ranges from -3.3 to 0.42, with a mean of almost zero. Higher values
denote a more pro-environmental position. The first dimension of the factor is then used as a
dependent variable.
3.2 Explanatory Variables
There are two key explanatory variables in this study, education and income. The data do not
provide exact figures for either variables. For instance, we do not know how many years of
formal education each respondent got. However, the survey provides ordinal measures.
The first main variable is income. It is coded on an ordinal scale in 5 categories. The lowest
category, which receives the value 1, denotes individuals who do not receive any income. The
next category indicates that the respondent receives up to twice the federal minimum wage. The
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minimum wage in 2012 was set at roughly 622 Reais, or US$306 per month.14 The third category
receives between two and five times the minimum wage; the fourth receives between five and ten
times the minimum wage; and the final category receives more than ten times this amount. The
mean value of 2.42 suggests that the respondents on average received between one and five times
the minimum wage. In line with the affluence hypothesis, we expect income to have a positive
effect on environmental preferences.
Since the ordinal category is somewhat crude, especially at the highest levels, we also repli-
cated the analysis while excluding the lowest or highest values. This is important because if
income had nonlinear effects, it would be important to have an accurate measure of respondents’
wealth levels. The results reported in the appendix suggest, however, that the finding is not
driven by any particular wealth level, be it high or low.
Education of the respondent is recorded in three categories, ranging from primary and sec-
ondary education to college degree, coded again on an ordinal scale. The value 1 is used for
respondents up to completed primary education, 2 for those who finished their secondary edu-
cation, and 3 for respondents who went to college. The sample’s average value is 1.9, suggesting
that a fair amount of respondents did not get a formal education beyond primary school.
For this variable, the main measurement concern is that it does not distinguish between
people who had some college education and those that finished a degree. Therefore, we also
replicated the analysis while excluding this category altogether. We found that there is a signif-
icant difference across lower levels of education, suggesting that the imprecise measurement of
tertiary education is not a major problem.
As we show in the appendix, the correlation between education and income is positive and
significant. This is not surprising, since education allows people access to better paying jobs.
Importantly, this could lead to multicollinearity. While multicollinearity would not bias our
estimates, it would increase their standard errors. Fortunately, post-estimation diagnostic tests
show that multicollinearity is not a problem in our estimation. The Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF) score, a measure of multicollinearity, never goes above 3 for our two variables in any of our
14Exchange rate on October 20, 2012. See “Brazil May Increase Minimum Wage to 622.73 Reais in 2012”, Bloomberg
News, November 22, 2011. Accessed on October 11, 2012.
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specifications. Furthermore, we re-estimate all models removing either income or education; we
find that our results still obtain. A complete cross-tabulation for income and education is also
provided in the supplementary appendix.
3.3 Control Variables
We include other possible variables, such as age, gender, and the location of the respondent as
control variables to our models. All variables were collected as part of the survey itself.
Many environmental problems are long-term issues. Intuitively, it would seem reasonable
that a respondent’s age, and thus potential exposure to future environmental degradation, may
affect environmental preferences. For example, Franzen and Meyer (2010) find that age has a
detrimental effect on environmental preferences. While the exact age of the respondents in our
survey was not recorded, we know to which cohort they belong. Cohorts are defined by decades.
Respondents under 20 are given a value of 1, those in their twenties are coded as 2, and so forth.
The last category, 6, includes all respondents older than 60 years. The main results assume that
the effect of age cohort is linear; robustness checks show that our results hold even if we use one
dummy variable for each cohort. The average age is 3.57 on our ordinal scale, meaning that the
average respondent was in her thirties. In the appendix, we replicate our results for respondents
who are above 20 years old, the rationale being that younger respondents may not have had the
opportunity to complete their education yet. Our results remain unaffected by this.
Gender has been shown to be correlated with numerous political and social preferences
(Stern, Dietz, and Kalof, 1993; Zelezny, Chua, and Aldrich, 2000). In our analysis, gender is
a simple dummy variable. We define 1 to be a female respondent. The sample contains slightly
more women (53%) than men.
Finally, there might be some unobserved effects correlated with geographical location. For
instance, some regions might be more vulnerable to environmental problems. We account for
geographical factors in two ways. First, we include two categorical dummy variables that indicate
if the respondents were living in a state capital or a state municipality. The omitted category
contains people living in rural areas. It seems intuitively plausible that individuals living in cities
or in the countryside differ in terms of their exposure to and preferences toward environmental
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problems, perhaps because of their occupation. For example, farmers and foresters could be
opposed to land use regulations.
Second, we include state fixed effects. The fixed effects account for systematic geographical,
economic, and cultural differences across Brazilian states. All our models include these fixed
effects, although we do not report them for lack of space. We also replicated our results using
region fixed effects and no fixed effects at all. The results, which are identical in all respects, can
again be found in the appendix.
We acknowledge that the survey did not record variables that may have been potential con-
founders. For instance, we do not know the respondents’ professional activity, which may affect
their responses. However, state and municipal type fixed effects help by controlling for the nature
of the local economy. Another concern pertains to partisan ideology. For example, respondents
who affiliate with leftist parties could be more supportive of regulation. This would be an issue
if education or income were correlated with partisan affiliation. However, a previous study by
Samuels (2006) suggests that this is not the case. His survey analysis from 2002 shows that parti-
san affiliation in Brazil is less common than in other countries, with only 35% of the population
considering themselves partisan, instead of the 40% average across the world. Controlling for
other factors, income and education also do not explain partisan affiliation. The only exception
is that income reduces the likelihood of affiliation with the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party.
Since this party does not have a distinct left-wing or right-wing ideology, the association does
not suggest an omitted variable bias. Of course, we acknowledge that this association should be
systematically tested in future studies of environmental preferences in Brazil.
3.4 Model
We estimate a fixed effects model for each of the four survey questions. The models have the
following form:
Environmental Concerni = α+ β1Incomei + β2Educationi + γ′Xi + φStates + ε i (1)
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where i and s denote the respondent and state, respectively. The vector X includes the individual-
level control variables listed above, while States captures state fixed effects. The parameters of
interests are β1 and β2, both of which are expected to be positive. All models are estimated with
least squares (OLS), except our third question, which is estimated with a logistic link function.
In the appendix, we use an ordered probit model, with very similar results. Since OLS is easier
to interpret, we report these estimates here. Finally, statistical tests have suggested the presence
of heteroskedasticity, which is why we report robust standard errors for all our specifications.
4 Findings
We first discuss our main findings and then report some additional analyses. Overall, we find
little evidence that income shapes environmental preferences of Brazilian respondents. However,
their education level is a significant predictor of environmental interest. The more education an
individual has, the more pro-environment she is expected to be. A further analysis shows that the
education effect materializes when individuals complete their secondary education. Respondents
that complete tertiary education are not more pro-environment than individuals who only hold
a secondary education degree.
4.1 Main Results
The main results are reported in Table 3. The responses to each of the four questions are es-
timated with and without control variables, while state fixed effects are always included. The
first four columns as well as the last four are linear models, and columns 5 and 6 report logistic
regression estimates. Recall that we expect both income and education to have a positive effect
on environmental preferences.
[Table 3 about here.]
Our results for education are unambiguous. We find that for all dependent variables, ed-
ucation is positively and statistically significantly correlated with environmental concern. This
finding is not driven by state-specific effects and is robust to the inclusion of age, gender, and
location controls. They are obtained for each questions as well as for our composite index.
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Beginning with our first question, which is measured on a five-point scale, we find that edu-
cation significantly affects how candidate’s environmental policy proposals are valued, whereas
income does not. Being more educated, e.g., having a secondary degree instead of only primary
schooling, increases the dependent variable by 0.2 units, equivalent to one sixth of this variable’s
standard deviation. Income has no such effect.
The second question is about environmental regulations in Brazil. It is coded on a three-point
scale, where higher values indicate that respondents prefer stronger laws protecting the environ-
ment. Again, the results provide clear support for the educational hypothesis, with significantly
positive effects being found in all models. A one unit increase in education levels, raises a re-
spondent’s desire for stringent environmental regulation by one tenth of a standard deviation.
No effect as to the importance of income is detected.
The third question asks whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the notion that the
Brazilian government should allow pollution to increase for the sake of its economic develop-
ment. The binary response is coded as 1 if the individual disagrees, meaning that she does not
think that development should take precedence over environmental concerns. Using logistic re-
gression, we calculate the predicted probability for being pro-environmental. As the substantive
effects plot in the appendix shows, increasing education levels from lowest to highest, increases
pro-environmental preferences, on average, by about 4% points. While this effect is non-trivial
and statistically significant, income does not predict variation in responses well.
The last question focused on the respondents’ preferences with respect to Brazil’s conduct
during international negotiations. Here, education increases the mean response to Brazil’s con-
sideration of the environment in international relations by 0.03 to 0.05 points on a 0-2 scale.
Income, on the other hand, has no observable effect. Moreover, notice that for income the sign of
our estimate switches depending on the exact model specification.
Finally, the same results are observed when considering our index derived from a factor
analysis. While it is difficult to interpret the index in itself, we find that being more educated in-
creases the value of the index by 1/5th to 1/4th of its standard deviation. The effect is significant
in all specifications.
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Taken together, our results consistently lend support to Hypothesis (2), but not Hypothe-
sis (1). Education is a positive predictor of pro-environmental attitudes, and the effect is always
statistically significant. Since the measurement of our dependent and independent variable dif-
fers from other studies, it is difficult to compare the magnitude of the effects. However, we note
that we find a monotonic effect of education, unlike Franzen and Meyer (2010) who, in some
specifications, find a U-shaped relation between education and environmental concern. In con-
trast, income does not have any effect on the respondents’ views toward the environment. In
light of the abundant literature suggesting that income matters for environmental preferences,
this non-effect is puzzling at first sight. However, it may capture the inconsistent effects of in-
come. While high income may increase the value of the environment as a good that the poor
cannot afford (Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Grossman and Krueger, 1995), the poor may at the
same time be more vulnerable to environmental hazards (Dunlap and Mertig, 1995). If these two
effects are equally strong in Brazil, the reported non-effect can be rationalized ex post.
4.2 Further Analyses
Given these initial findings, we want to better understand which level of education matters
the most. Also, we want to carefully examine if the non-finding on income is really due to
this variable’s inability to predict environmental preferences, or may potentially be due to non-
linearities that our previous model specifications could not adequately capture. If independent
variables were to operate in a non-linear fashion, the results from above would be biased. To
foreshadow, we find that non-linear model specifications produce results similar to those from
linear estimation. Income continues to be insignificant, whereas education has a positive effect
on environmental interests; completing secondary education is found to have the strongest effect.
For this analysis, we create dummy variables for each category of our education and income
variable. To avoid perfect multicollinearity, we use k− 1 categories, with the lowest level of edu-
cational attainment and the no income group being the baseline categories; all point estimates are
thus to be interpreted relative to this omitted baseline. While dropping the linearity assumption
makes our models more general, the small number of cases in some categories inflates the size
of the estimated confidence intervals. The main results from this analysis are reported in Table 4,
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where the same set of controls and estimation techniques are used as above.
[Table 4 about here.]
For education, we find that the main effect kicks in once secondary education is obtained,
while the additional increase in environmental concern from secondary and college education is
almost negligible. In a country like Brazil, this makes the middle class the most likely supporters
of pro-environmental attitudes.
As for income, we detect some evidence of an inverted-U shaped relationship to environmen-
tal concern. Those with income levels between two and five minimum wages, roughly at the
mean of the sample, are more pro-environmental than the poorest respondents of the survey. In
addition, we find that the wealthiest individuals with salaries of more than ten minimum wages
hold less pro-environmental positions than the poorest respondents with no income at all. These
estimates are always negative, but mostly statistically insignificant. The lower middle class seems
to be the most likely to support environmental views and regulations.
Why might this be the case? Some previous survey studies suggest that wealthier individuals
often have negative environmental perceptions (Dunlap and Mertig, 1995), while others find the
opposite to be true (Franzen and Meyer, 2010). In the Brazilian context, wealthy individuals,
such as large ranchers and industrialists, depend for their livelihoods on activities that cause
environmental degradation. This may explain why we find evidence for negative environmental
perceptions among the wealthy. As to the poorest, proponents of the environmental Kuznets
curve have proposed that at low income levels, individuals have more pressing concerns than the
environment (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). Our findings offer slight support for these claims,
going against the view that the poor are interested in environmental affairs because they are
vulnerable to environmental risks (Dasgupta et al., 2006) and dependent on natural resources
(Cavendish, 2000).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the determinants of public opinion about four important views on en-
vironmental policy. We focused on the effects of income and education, since theoretical scholar-
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ship suggests that these are central factors that determine environmental views. We investigated
these questions using survey data from Brazil. We find unambiguous support for the hypothesis
that education has a beneficial effect on pro-environmental preferences. The effect takes place for
individuals who completed secondary education. The added contribution of college education
is minimal.
Unlike many studies (Diekmann and Franzen, 1999; Franzen, 2003), we find little support for
the idea that income has a linear effect on environmental preferences. The estimated coefficients
in our main models are insignificant. In light of previous studies, one plausible explanation for
this non-effect is that income both increases people’s valuation of the environment as a luxury
good and reduces their vulnerability to risks (Dunlap and Mertig, 1995; Grossman and Krueger,
1995; Franzen and Meyer, 2010). Allowing for nonlinear relationships, we find tentative evidence
of an inverted-U shaped effect of income, whereby the middle class tends to be more favorable
to environmental policies. The wealthiest respondents tended to be the least environmental
individuals. While this evidence is not conclusive, further research on nonlinearities appears
warranted.
Overall, we make two main contributions. First, we offer new evidence on the socio-economic
determinants of environmental preferences. We show that education is a key determinant of
public opinion about the environment in Brazil. This augments an increasing literature on the
positive effects of education on environmental concern (Franzen and Meyer, 2010). Second, we
provide one of the first quantitative survey studies on the views of citizens from an emerging
country. Despite growing importance for the future of global environmental regulation, little
is known about individuals’ preferences from these countries. As Brazil may reasonably be ex-
pected to become one of the most important countries for the production of global environmental
public goods, understanding what drives their citizens’ preferences is key. This is particularly
true for democracies in which domestic voters have a non-trivial impact on policymaking.
Two questions arise from there. First, what does our study tell us about environmental
preferences in other emerging countries? With the rise of large regional and global powers such
as China, India, or Indonesia, the need for a clearer view of environmental preferences in these
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local agents is tremendous. Nonetheless, the Brazilian case may suggest that informational effects
dominate over income effects. Therefore, an affordable education system, with as little political
interference as possible, is needed for increased environmental awareness. Thus, our findings
are likely to exert more leverage in democracies like India than compared to China.
Second, what are the policy implications of our findings? Our results suggest that education is
a key driver of pro-environmental views. Governments interested in promoting environmental
awareness should invest in public education. Encouragingly, the lack of clear income effects
suggests that such investments could also enhance environmental awareness among the poor.
Increased wealth seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient for environmental awareness. The
nonlinear models also suggest that the move from primary to secondary education suffices to
cause an effect. A college education, which remains beyond the reach of large segments of
people in developing countries, is not necessary for improved environmental awareness.
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Table 1: Dependent Variables
Q Variable Coding
Q1 Env in Candidate’s Proposals When choosing whom to vote for, do you take into
account the candidate’s proposals on the environ-
ment?
Never = 0
Rarely = 1
Sometimes = 2
Frequently = 3
Always = 4
Q2 Sufficiency of Environmental Legislation In your opinion, environmental legislation in Brazil
is:
Too rigorous = 0
Adequate = 1
Too lenient = 2
Q3 Allow Increase in Pollution Levels Do you agree or disagree with the following state-
ment? If it is important for the country’s economic
development, the Brazilian government should allow
pollution to increase.
Agree = 0
Disagree = 1
Q4 Env in Intl Negotiations When negotiating with other countries, how IMPOR-
TANT do you think Brazil should rate the environ-
ment?
Not important = 0
Not very important = 1
Very important = 2
DK/DA: missing
27
Table 2: Summary statistics
mean sd min max count
Dependent Variables
Env in Candidate’s Proposals 3.01 1.23 0 4 1170
Sufficiency of Environmental Legislation 1.70 0.54 0 2 1188
Allow Increase in Pollution Levels 0.93 0.25 0 1 1217
Env in Intl Negotiations 1.91 0.34 0 2 1214
Factor Analysis Q1-Q4 0.00 0.53 -3.34 0.42 1132
Independent Variables
Income 2.42 0.98 1 5 1152
Education 1.96 0.71 1 3 1219
Age 3.62 1.56 1 6 1221
Female Respondent 0.53 0.50 0 1 1226
Capital (Indicator) 0.25 0.43 0 1 1226
Metro (Indicator) 0.10 0.30 0 1 1226
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Table 3: Analysis of environmental preferences for a sample of Brazilian citizens.
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Factor Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Income 0.009 0.007 -0.016 -0.008 0.022 0.097 -0.011 0.010 -0.019 0.003
(0.042) (0.046) (0.019) (0.021) (0.142) (0.171) (0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.020)
Education 0.204∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.050∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.059) (0.024) (0.025) (0.200) (0.213) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.025)
Age 0.055∗∗ 0.009 0.002 -0.032∗∗∗ -0.012
(0.026) (0.012) (0.089) (0.008) (0.012)
Female Respondent 0.196∗∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.466∗ 0.009 0.104∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.034) (0.276) (0.021) (0.035)
Capital (Indicator) -0.103 0.153∗∗∗ 0.285 -0.006 0.043
(0.096) (0.035) (0.332) (0.026) (0.037)
Metro (Indicator) -0.208 0.048 -0.876 -0.042 -0.081
(0.163) (0.062) (0.547) (0.051) (0.072)
Constant 2.716∗∗∗ 2.462∗∗∗ 1.328∗∗∗ 1.215∗∗∗ 1.766∗ 1.366 1.874∗∗∗ 1.949∗∗∗ -0.248 -0.298
(0.353) (0.364) (0.157) (0.163) (1.035) (1.066) (0.065) (0.069) (0.179) (0.184)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .04 .05 .05 .07 .03 .05 .04 .05
σ 1.21 1.21 .53 .52 .34 .33 .51 .51
Observations 1101 1099 1116 1114 1089 1087 1138 1136 1069 1067
See text for the dependent variables. Columns 1-4 and 7-10: linear regressions. Columns 5-6: logistic regressions.
Huber-White (robust) standard errors reported in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Expanded analysis of environmental preferences for a sample of Brazilian citizens. Omit-
ted baseline categories are the least educated and the poorest groups.
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Factor Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Up to 2 Minimum Wages 0.029 0.035 0.053 0.068 -0.228 -0.181 -0.048∗ -0.038 -0.017 0.001
(0.114) (0.115) (0.048) (0.047) (0.363) (0.367) (0.029) (0.029) (0.041) (0.041)
2-5 Minimum Wages 0.202∗ 0.218∗ 0.064 0.094∗ 0.210 0.403 -0.017 0.020 0.044 0.097∗∗
(0.122) (0.127) (0.051) (0.055) (0.420) (0.454) (0.031) (0.032) (0.045) (0.046)
5-10 Minimum Wages 0.016 0.011 0.048 0.066 0.173 0.368 -0.030 0.028 -0.003 0.053
(0.160) (0.164) (0.070) (0.073) (0.569) (0.629) (0.038) (0.040) (0.059) (0.061)
>10 Minimum Wages -0.125 -0.113 -0.207∗ -0.183 -0.482 -0.214 -0.090 -0.016 -0.238∗ -0.152
(0.241) (0.251) (0.115) (0.117) (0.691) (0.777) (0.064) (0.068) (0.143) (0.147)
Secondary Education 0.302∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗ 0.685∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.030 0.175∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.101) (0.040) (0.042) (0.288) (0.304) (0.028) (0.029) (0.042) (0.043)
Tertiary Education 0.383∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.097∗ 0.850∗∗ 0.738∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.042 0.226∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.117) (0.049) (0.052) (0.392) (0.413) (0.029) (0.029) (0.048) (0.051)
Age 0.059∗∗ 0.012 0.008 -0.033∗∗∗ -0.011
(0.026) (0.012) (0.090) (0.008) (0.012)
Female Respondent 0.220∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.512∗ 0.012 0.113∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.035) (0.275) (0.021) (0.035)
Capital (Indicator) -0.101 0.157∗∗∗ 0.300 -0.007 0.044
(0.096) (0.036) (0.330) (0.026) (0.037)
Metro (Indicator) -0.206 0.053 -0.900 -0.044 -0.081
(0.164) (0.062) (0.552) (0.051) (0.073)
Constant 2.823∗∗∗ 2.514∗∗∗ 1.281∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗ 2.404∗∗ 1.933∗ 1.922∗∗∗ 2.011∗∗∗ -0.187 -0.246
(0.347) (0.363) (0.150) (0.157) (1.095) (1.140) (0.063) (0.070) (0.173) (0.181)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .05 .06 .06 .08 .03 .05 .05 .07
σ 1.21 1.21 .53 .52 .34 .33 .51 .51
Observations 1101 1099 1116 1114 1089 1087 1138 1136 1069 1067
See text for the dependent variables. Columns 1-4 and 7-10: linear regressions. Columns 5-6: logistic regressions.
Huber-White (robust) standard errors reported in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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